Since then, the raids have escalated into more sustained engagements that have forced the Saudis to call in airstrikes inside their own territory. The deadliest incident was the aforementioned September 4 missile strike, in which an SS Scarab a. Pro-Houthi media sources claimed four Apaches were destroyed, along with forty other vehicles. That said, Houthi resistance is stiffening, and the difficult task of liberating urban centers such as Taizz and Sana is still to come.
So far, the campaign has highlighted a range of challenges that the United States could help its GCC allies overcome: Missile defense tactics. In Marib Slut September 4 attack underlines the severe risk that enemy surface-to-surface missiles pose to both coalition forces in Yemen and Saudi civilians. In addition to supporting GCC theater missile defenses, U.
They should also advise on operational security to prevent valuable targeting data from reaching the enemy via social media posts, as might have in Marib Slut the case at FOB Safir.
Armor survivability. GCC and pro-Hadi forces will encounter similar problems as they penetrate deeper into Houthi-defended areas. The Saudi military needs urgent assistance to improve its armor survivability, including improvised up-armoring through add-on kits and better tactics and training.
Stability operations. New unit generation. Yet development of this unit is stumbling because southern separatist Yemeni militias are predictably unenthusiastic about deploying alongside tribal forces affiliated with northern factions under Maj. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the Islah Party. The shortfall in trained Yemeni recruits has forced the coalition to look elsewhere for manpower β the UAE is now recruiting Somali volunteers, and Sudan is considering the deployment of 6, ground troops to go along with the aircraft it has already contributed.
